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Get Innovation, Patent Hold-Up, And Equilibrium Effects Of RAND

G users of patented technology access to antitrust courts has been proposed as a remedy for the problem of patent ambush, a type of post-investment hold-up. In this paper, we identify a cause of hold-up that has not been previously associated with patent ambush, that incomplete contracts are subject to renegotiation as the future unfolds. Parties who make relationship-specific investments expect to be held up by their trading partners and adjust accordingly, often by under-investing. Our m.

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